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INTRODUCTION
Organized discussions among legal scholars rarely instigate
roiling controversies. Truth be told, it is generally deemed an
achievement to maintain a wakeful state during these enclaves. The
Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution Conference gauging the fu-
ture of arbitration was exceptional in a number of respects. The
topics and presentations were invigorating. Several practitioners,
in particular, delivered outstanding papers. The sponsoring stu-
dent journal demonstrated nimble managerial skills. No stone of
accommodation or convenience was left unturned for the partici-
pants. I was also very impressed with the young academic lawyers
who are active in the area of arbitration. Their contribution and
commentary bespeak a most promising future for the field. In ad-
dition, far from inducing intellectual somnabulence, the proceed-
ings generated in me a need to respond in writing to aspects of the
conference, aided by the benefit of distance and further reflection.
In this article, although I include a development on interna-
tional arbitration, I am responding primarily to the panel discus-
sion on disparate-party arbitration to which I was a participant.
The last occasion to move me to write a written response to an
academic event was nearly twenty-five years ago when Professors
Willis Reese, Charles Szladits, and George Bermann put me
through the paces of my doctoral defense at Columbia. The com-
mittee's observations inspired me to write an article exploring the
analytical implications of the views that were exchanged.1 The
topic under discussion then was also arbitration.
1 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Rendering Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common
Law of International Transactions, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201 (1985).
2 My dissertation chapters were: Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of its
Remedial and Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 33 (1984); The
Reform of the French Procedural Law on Arbitration: An Analytical Commentary on the Decree
of May 14, 1980, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 273 (1981); The Elaboration of A French
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Some aspects of the panel on disparate-party arbitration, how-
ever, brought about a type of 'reverse' inspiration. The organiza-
tion of the discussion, unconnected to student efforts, seemed to
stifle the full expression of views. In fact, some speakers and their
views seemed to be entrapped by the structure of the panel. More-
over, statements were made about arbitration that were, at best,
misrepresentations of the process or, at worst, patent disparage-
ments. The impression created by one speaker was that arbitration
is not only flawed, but reprehensible as well-an ignoble form of
adjudication that achieved contemptible ends. In my view, it was
an objectively unsustainable appraisal of arbitration. Advocacy has
a place in our society. It is important to the protection of rights.
The tunnel vision of zealous representation, however, can consti-
tute a pathway to irresponsible "spin" and defamatory
characterizations.
The manipulation of the panel and persistent distortions of ar-
bitration made it difficult to maintain an intellectually sound ap-
proach toward the topic. In my opinion, foregone ideological
conclusions overwhelmed the aims of salutary professional discus-
sion. Little if any consideration was given to the fact that the U.S.
Supreme Court-a mixed political body with the charge of instil-
ling and preserving the rule of the law in our society-envisages
arbitration as instrumental to American democracy. 3
Arbitration is not just another trial procedure. It epitomizes a
practical understanding of the purpose and value of adjudicatory
procedures. It poses a substantial challenge to adversarial litiga-
Court Doctrine On International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial
Creativity, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1981).
3 The U.S. Supreme Court began its endorsement and promotion of arbitration by pro-
claiming the existence of "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements .... Moses
H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). See also Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1986); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). It then introduced a
qualified sense of contract freedom in arbitration, providing that the contracting parties were
free to structure their transactions however they wished as long as they opted for arbitration. See
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). Thereafter, the Court ex-
panded the jurisdiction of arbitration to include statutory disputes. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1986). The Court also increased substantially the
decisional sovereignty of the arbitrator. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79
(2002); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). The effect of these decisions was to
permit arbitration to function with even greater autonomy and, concomitantly, to minimize the
role of judicial supervision in the process. They also sought to reduce the volume of litigation
pertaining to arbitration. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995);
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). In its decisional law, the Court is bent
upon delegating as much of the burden of civil litigation as possible to arbitration.
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tion by exposing its underlying irrationality and its destructive im-
pact upon society. It guarantees the rule of law domestically and
internationally through affordable access, expedited proceedings,
expertise, and bridging the gap between national legal systems. It
is a valuable institution that should not become a pawn in the tired
and unimaginative political discourse that substitutes 'talking
points' for genuine reflection and debate. The gravamen of the
current attack on arbitration is not the preservation of American
constitutional culture, but the advancement of an ideological
agenda and the economic self-interest of a special interest group
favored by those in power. The high-minded rhetoric simply cre-
ates a respectable camouflage for engaging in collusion, greed, and
self-serving partisanship.
Arbitration is dangerous because its functionality debunks the
myths about judicial litigation. It hinders the selling of protracted
legal proceedings and enormous processing fees to the public as an
indispensable part of political citizenship. Adversarial adjudica-
tion, like government by quarreling cabals, amounts to an act of
social suicide. Positing victory at all costs, without the possibility of
compromise, clashes with the instinct of self-preservation. In its
best manifestation, it induces litigating parties to settle or surren-
der in order to minimize the wounds and hardship of combat. In
effect, access to justice is achieved by denying it. Cynicism reigns
and supplants humanity's nobility.
Arbitration embodies a trial process grounded in common
sense, flexibility, and an ethic of problem-solving. Arbitral pro-
ceedings allow disputing parties and their representatives to assem-
ble the facts, present witnesses, assert and contest positions, and
argue about governing predicates. They culminate in a final ruling
by the adjudicator on the matters under consideration. Only a true
failure in procedural fairness may lead to a viable appeal. In other
words, arbitration personifies due process and justice. It enables
society to resolve disputes and to prosper by dedicating its re-
sources to other activities.
Arbitration withstood the prejudicial assessments of old. It
outlasted judicial animosity. It has discredited the religion of pro-
cess. It traverses the formidable cultural divides between varying
national concepts of justice. It undergirds global economic transac-
tions. One of the critical questions of contemporary arbitration
law, effectively identified and voiced at the Cardozo conference, is
whether "bilaterality" is essential to the lawfulness of the contract
of arbitration and the domestic legitimacy of the arbitral process.
398 CARD OZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 10:395
THE FAIRNESS OF ADHESIONARY ARBITRATION
The conference proceedings raised a number of substantive is-
sues that deserve further commentary. The panel on disparate-
party arbitration drew attention to the fairness of the contractual
recourse to arbitration when it involved unequal parties and rulings
upon statutory rights. At the outset, it must be established that to
describe this process as "mandatory arbitration" is at least mislead-
ing, if not wholly inaccurate. The use of that phrase is likely to
create confusion with so-called court-annexed arbitration.4 The
latter is indeed mandatory because state legislatures obligate liti-
gants to undergo this process before they can proceed with their
lawsuits. This form of arbitration was especially prevalent in the
1970s and 1980s as a means of satisfying the public's appetite for
litigation resources.5 Recourse was mandatory but the result was
not binding for reasons of constitutional due process of law.6 In
her presentation, Professor Amy Schmitz provided a thorough ana-
lytical account of contemporary court-annexed arbitration
systems.7
Arbitration agreements involving consumers and non-union-
ized employees are not related to the exercise of political authority
by state legislatures." They involve parties of disparate power posi-
tions and levels of sophistication, who are brought together in the
circumstances of adhesion because the transaction harbors mutual
benefit. This form of arbitration is "mandatory" only in the sense
that it is imposed by the stronger party as a precondition to trans-
acting with the weaker party. It is, therefore, both more accurate
and user-friendly to name this form of arbitration "adhesionary" or
"disparate-party" arbitration.
The proposed "Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007," which may
yet be enacted, seeks to rectify the equity problems with adhesion-
ary or disparate-party arbitration by voiding arbitration agree-
4 Amy J. Schmitz, Nonconsensual + Nonbinding = Nonsensical? Reconsidering Court-Con-
nected Arbitration Programs, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 587 (2009).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See id. See also BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN Dis-
TRicr COURTS (1990); A. Leo Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 537
(1983); John P. McIver & Susan Keilitz, Court-Annexed Arbitration: An Introduction, 14 JUST.
Sys. J. 123 (1991); ELIZABETH S. ROLPH, INTRODUCING COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: A
POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE (1985).
8 See generally THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2006).
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ments in employment, consumer, and franchise transactions.9 It
also invalidates such agreements in decisional circumstances in-
volving civil rights, or when the litigation involves a law regulating
the validity of contracts in transactional situations in which the par-
ties are unequal.' 0 Both the political left and right seem to favor
the legislative revision of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) § 2
9 See S. 1782, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). The
stated purpose of the bills is to dismantle the process of mandatory arbitration in disparate-party
transactional circumstances: "No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable
if it requires arbitration of-(1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or (2) a dispute
arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or transactions
between parties of unequal bargaining power." S. 1782, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 3010,
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). It also eliminates, apparently in all arbitration circumstances, the
jurisdictional or kompetenz-kompetenz powers of the arbitrator: "[Tlhe validity or enforceabil-
ity of an agreement to arbitrate shall be determined by the court, rather than an arbitrator,
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement spe-
cifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such agreement." S. 1782,
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). The latter provision
reverses or eliminates the effect of the separability doctrine. It also seems to eliminate any
reference to state contract law and to create-wholesale-a special federal law of contracts ap-
plying exclusively to arbitration agreements. This federal contract law for arbitration propounds
the limited validity of arbitration contracts and places particular encumbrances upon their range
of application. In effect, if the bill is enacted into law, the U.S. Congress will discriminate
against arbitration as a form of contract by placing disabling requirements upon it in certain
transactions. By so doing, the Congress will be engaging in conduct that the U.S. Supreme Court
forbade to the states for years through the federal preemption doctrine.
Finally, in keeping with Justice Douglas' legacy on arbitration, the proposed legislation "ex-
empts arbitration in collective bargaining agreements" from the regulation established in the
legislation. See S. 1782, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
Justice Douglas was a virulent critic of arbitration in all circumstances but those of labor-man-
agement relations. Like Justice Douglas, the proponents of the legislation approve of the tradi-
tional role of arbitration in achieving industrial self-governance in the unionized workplace. In
their view, union representation establishes a sufficient level of protection to guarantee the es-
sential fairness of this application of arbitration. It is again interesting to note that the federal
decisional law, especially the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, arrives at a diametrically op-
posed conclusion. In the latter, the Court believed that the union's collective interest prevented
union members from asserting their personal acquiescence to the arbitrability of their individual
statutory rights through the union. As a result, the individual union member needed to affirm
personally the arbitrability of disputes involving citizenship guarantees. In the final analysis, it is
difficult to comprehend why an employee's interests are seen as advantaged in one form of
arbitration and not the other.
10 It should be emphasized that the stated purpose of the proposed legislation not only bans
arbitral clauses in the identified transactional circumstances, but it also prohibits the arbitrability
of civil rights disputes on the basis of subject matter. Both aspects of the bills stand in contradis-
tinction to the U.S. Supreme Court's long-standing decisional law on arbitration. The latter
provides for a wide, if not unlimited, rule of arbitrability that is not constrained by subject-
matter considerations or transactional inequality. The Court's objective in devising this law was
to guarantee citizen access to a functional and effective process of adjudication. The proposed
law simply bans arbitration without creating more courts, naming judges to unfilled positions, or
correcting the abuses and dysfunctionality of judicial litigation.
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on this basis. Their motivation for doing so, however, is quite dif-
ferent." The left is preoccupied with the unfairness associated
with a contract imposed unilaterally by the stronger party upon the
weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.12 The need of the left to
rescue its traditional constituencies from 'monstrous' corporate
practices is compelled by its history, ideology, and the dictates of
electoral advantage. The right propounds a position based upon
the sanctity and freedom of contract. 13 Parties in the marketplace
should be at liberty to agree to any exchange to which they mutu-
ally consent and which complies with the minimal requisites of
public policy. Once established, party commitment to a mutual
agreement is binding and enforceable law between the parties. Co-
erced agreements are not consensual undertakings; the authority of
law cannot be used to give them effect. The rightist critique of
disparate-party arbitration is an objection based upon fundamen-
tal, albeit abstract, principles. Like its leftist counterpart, it ignores
practical consequences and is seemingly unmindful of the interests
of average Americans. In the final analysis, both positions are ide-
11 The pre-conference e-mail exchange between participants indicated strong opposition
from both ideological sectors to the use of contract to achieve the ends of consumer arbitration.
The exchange motivated the subsequent discussion in the text.
12 The leftist criticism is expressed thoroughly in the "Findings" contained in the "Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act 2007." S. 1782, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007). The statements made in this section of the proposed legislation constitute a veritable
"manifesto" against arbitration that distorts the process, as well as the impact of the current
governing law. The declarations are built upon a set of false and conclusory assumptions about
the functioning of the court system, unabashed ideological and political convictions, and an ill-
concealed objective of advancing the individual self-interests of favored groups. The alleged
contractual unfairness of arbitration proceeds from a misconception about the purpose and real-
ity of dispute resolution. It is anchored in the contrived reality of an ideological world. The
would-be abuse is at best theoretical. The legislative critique mouths the criticism of arbitration
advanced by American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA). Regardless of how justice is defined,
arbitration undeniably depreciates the business interest, adversarial skills, and the professional
necessity of ATLA members by creating a more effective and efficient civil dispute resolution
process. Eliminating the option for arbitration is equivalent to relegating American citizens to
the emergency room for their health care needs.
13 This position was advanced by Professor Huber in his email response to my written re-
marks on the "Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007." He also appeared to state that the protection
of legal rights in arbitration has been best achieved at the state court level. The latter position
coincides to some extent with the views of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas on the fate of states'
rights in arbitration under the FAA. In this sense, they reflect a rightist position. See Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. Tr. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In my view, this
position does not sufficiently take into account the federal preemption doctrine. On the latter,
see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Buckeye Check Cash-
ing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008).
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ological blatter, statements so detached from actual reality that
they fail to elucidate, guide, or proffer effective solutions.
The nullification of arbitration agreements in entire transac-
tional areas is a radical and costly solution to the problem of co-
erced acquiescence to, or participation in, arbitration. 14  It is a
blanket condemnation of adhesionary or disparate-party arbitra-
tion that disregards the substantial benefits of the process. The
projected law, in effect, states that adhesionary or disparate-party
arbitration is an absolute evil in all circumstances and cannot ever
be redeemed or justified. By contrast, the right to appear and de-
fend in court is seen as an absolute good and vital to the integrity
of society and the deliverance of justice to American citizens.
1 5
The position incorporated into the bill is not only impolitic,
but impractical as well. In effect, it deprives weaker parties of an
opportunity to benefit from arbitration and its advantages. The
stigma that this legislation imposes on arbitration will make volun-
tary recourse by the vast majority of consumers and employees,
who are uninformed about the process, extremely unlikely. The
proposed law clouds or conceals the irrefutable fact that arbitration
can provide access to adjudicatory services that are affordable, pro-
fessional, expert, and enforceable.16 It ignores developing and al-
ready developed case law that has effectively addressed the
fairness concern in adhesionary or disparate-party arbitration.
1 7
These judicial rulings establish that arbitral proceedings between
unequal parties must be administered by a neutral, outside institu-
tion, that both parties must be equally obligated to arbitrate dis-
putes, and that the costs of arbitration should be borne by the
imposing party or, at the very least, cannot serve to discourage or
prevent recourse to the process.
1 8
14 S. 1782, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
15 S. 1782, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
16 On the virtues of arbitration, see Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution In Law
Through Arbitration, 56 CLEVE. ST. L. REv. 233 (2003).
17 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 6
P.3d 669 (2000); Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Ca., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 988 P.2d 67 (1999);
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 938 P.2d 903 (1997). See also
Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak House, Inc., 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001); Walker v. Ryan's Family
Steak House, Inc., 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998), affd, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); Hooters of Am.,
Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Garrett v. Hooters-Toldeo, 295 F. Supp. 2d 774
(N.D. Ohio 2003).
18 See, e.g., Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669; Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado,
Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Walker, 400 F.3d 370.
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Contrary to the myths surrounding it, adversarial judicial liti-
gation is a specialized remedy that is not suitable for all types of
disputes. Its utility may be most evident in the prosecution and
defense of criminal cases. It is beyond the kin of, and excessive for,
modest civil disputes, which are the most common disputes involv-
ing American citizens. When the expenses of arbitration are
defrayed or subsidized by the stronger party, arbitration becomes a
vastly superior means of access to adjudication, even when contin-
gency fee arrangements or pro bono representation are taken into
account.
DEBT COLLECTION CASES
A number of panelists made much of debt collection cases,
portraying them as a decisive illustration of the unfairness of the
arbitral process. Statistics were advanced with dizzying speed from
the Public Citizen Study19 that allegedly established beyond any
doubt that arbitration in this area favored unequivocally the corpo-
rate party. Indebted credit card patrons lost the vast majority of
the arbitrations. Imagine that! Nothing, according to these advo-
cates, could be more unjustified than holding a debtor liable for
incurred debt. A recent article establishes with substantial credi-
bility that the Study misrepresents its own numbers, that the num-
bers themselves are misleading, and that diametrically opposite
conclusions apply.20 The simple point made by experienced attor-
19 The Arbitration Trap (Sept. 2007), www.citizen.org/publication/release.cfm?=ID=7543.
20 Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration,
15-1 Disp. REs. MAO. 30, 31-32 (2008):
A July 2008 study that Navigant Consulting performed at the behest of the Institute
for Legal Reform analyzed the same data set that Public Citizen considered, but
found major discrepancies between the underlying data and Public Citizen's statisti-
cal analysis of it. According to Navigant's report, Public Citizen's numbers are quite
misleading. Navigant reported that Public Citizen slanted its numbers by omitting
from its analysis more than 8,000 cases that were dismissed without an award before
an arbitrator was selected because the creditor decided not to pursue charges for lack
of evidence or otherwise. When the dismissed cases are included in the data set
where the prevailing party is identified, the analysis reveals that consumers prevailed
in initiated arbitration cases 32.1 percent of the time. According to Public Citizen's
own spreadsheet, consumers prevailed in nearly every case that Public Citizen omit-
ted from its percentages. Moreover, even in the cases where Public Citizen identifies
the business as the prevailing party, the consumer was frequently successful in reduc-
ing the amount the business sought. Consumers won reductions in 37.4 percent of
the cases that went to hearing, with a median reduction of $824. More impressive, in
3,632 of the 16,054 cases where there was no hearing because the respondent de-
faulted, the arbitrator refused to award the entire amount the business requested.
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neys during the conference debate was that debt collection is no
different in arbitration than in court or through small claims proce-
dures.21 No one likes to be held accountable or confirmed to be in
financial straits. Often, the last resort is to blame someone else.
The most probative cause of these financial difficulties probably
resides with the lack of household budgets, instances of economic
misfortune sometimes associated with the accumulation of unin-
sured medical costs, or uncontrolled, pathological, personal spend-
ing habits.
The leftist critique sought to reinterpret the reality of circum-
stances in order to privilege the standing and interest of parties or
positions that its agenda required it to endorse. The Bill of Rights
does not mandate a "make-over" of indebted consumers or a "re-
doing" of their practices any more than an abnegation of legitimate
majoritarian interests. It may, in fact, impose a principle of ac-
countability for individual conduct within the context of sufficient
and suitable adjudicatory procedures. Shifting the blame for
human misfortune and personal anguish to arbitration is simply un-
tenable and, ultimately, absurd. Sales and marketing practices are
more likely culprits, as are choices regarding individual behavior.22
CORPORATE DUALITY IN THE USE OF ARBITRATION
The critics further distorted the issues by contending that com-
panies which imposed arbitration on their employers and custom-
ers refused to use the process to resolve their own disputes. The
assertion was intended to foster the impression that companies es-
poused a duplicitous view of arbitration. Their goal was to show
The median reduction for consumers was $599. This may be because "[i]n cases ad-
ministered under the NAF Code of Procedure, the arbitrator considers all evidence,
whether or not there is a response to the claim." This added layer of protection is
unavailable to consumers in civil litigation, where default judgments are entered on
sums certain without consideration of the underlying evidence. The average con-
sumer thus comes out ahead in arbitration, compared to court.
Id. See also SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERI-
CAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (Prelim. Rep. Mar. 2009), available at http://www.searle
arbitration.org/report/pr.php. The report presents a generally favorable view of AAA consumer
arbitration. See id. It has already been attacked by left-leaning groups. See American Associa-
tion for Justice, Searle Institute Report Shows Mandatory Arbitration Favors Corporations Over
Consumers, available at, http://www.justice.org/resources/searle-arbitration-rebut.pdf.
21 See Robert Davidson, Esq., Remarks at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Sympo-
sium: Wither Arbitration? (Nov. 6, 2008).
22 See Robert Manning, Credit Card Nation, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, Dec. 1,
2000, http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/credit/reports/.
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that it functions as an instrument of repression of the dispossessed
members of society. The inexorable conclusion was that arbitra-
tion represented substandard and illegitimate adjudication. The as-
sault, however, was unsuccessful. Several panelists demonstrated
convincingly that companies were not migrating to the courtroom
for their own disputes.23 The statistical suggestions to the contrary
were simply mistaken.
The recourse of arbitration in matters of transborder com-
merce for instance, is a virtual necessity. As long as there is lucra-
tive global business, multinational commercial enterprises see
arbitration as a supplier of the dispute resolution stability and con-
sistency demanded by their transactions.24 Arbitration is a unique
process. It may not be "a formula for world peace, 25 but it sup-
plies a neutral transnational venue, commercial expertise, and
binding results. It thereby enables global merchants to transcend
the conflicts of law and the jurisdictional paralysis of private inter-
national law.2 6 Arbitration's ability to transcend systemic differ-
ences among legal systems explains its enormous transborder
success. 27 It has cemented the rule of law in a sphere of activity in
which attempted global governance has always met with failure. It
is therefore inconceivable that international merchants would
abandon their allegiance to, or use of, such a remarkable process
that so effectively allows them to engage in commerce.
Domestic companies are no less aware of the value and virtues
of arbitration. Though their concerns are not due to the venue's
parochial character, crossborder enforcement, or the disarray
among legal traditions, managers of domestic corporations seek to
avoid the inefficiencies and the expensive histrionics of potentially
commercially inexpert judicial trials. They mightily resist recon-
ceptualizing commercial problems into a legal language.2 8 They
23 See Christopher Drahozal & Peter Rutledge, Remarks at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law Symposim: Wither Arbitration? (Nov. 6, 2008).
24 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
773 (2002).
25 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614.665 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
26 See Carbonneau, The Ballad, supra note 24.
27 Id.
28 See CPR Law Firm Policy Statement On Alternatives To Litigation, http://www.
cpradr.orgfPortals/0/lawfirmpledge.pdf (last visited March 1, 2009); see also Vince Vitkowsky,
The Global Litigation Lottery, MARKET WATCH, Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/
news/story/global-litigation-lotterystory.aspx?guid=% 7BF4EF6F8-4296-8F63-225784.
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are generally unwilling to cede control of their destiny to the judi-
cial apparatus and fight their battles on alien turf.
2 9
Nonetheless, there are other, nonstatistical indications that ar-
bitration could be subject to domestic re-evaluation or retrench-
ment. One current belief is that federal judges, many of them
weary of presiding over criminal proceedings involving drug deal-
ers, are hankering for more commercial law and contract cases.30
In effect, judges resent that arbitrators get all the "good" cases.
Standard commercial law cases pose no security risk and require
adjudicators to engage in traditional analytical thinking that re-
minds legal actors of the reasons for their choice of vocation. Also,
a few business parties have recently expressed a favorable view of
using settlement in judicial litigation to resolve disputes. 31 When
litigation is conducted through arbitration, the process ordinarily
goes through to completion and the matter in dispute is decided by
the arbitrators.32 The advantage of settlement, it is argued, is that
it provides greater control over the outcome and its timing. In ef-
fect, a judicial proceeding is a third-party framework in which the
litigating commercial parties can define and evaluate the problems
and engage in negotiations to find a mutually acceptable resolution
of their conflicts.
Despite the lack of statistical foundation, the foregoing devel-
opments attest to real domestic misgivings about the continued use
of arbitration. The disposition of the users of and players in the
process are an accurate benchmark of the process' standing. Statis-
tical analyses often reflect particular interests and are no better or
worse than well-paid expert witnesses. They provide a window to
reality, but the pane of glass can magnify or shrink objects or, at
times, inaccurately represent them. Optical illusions can occur,
structures can be misrepresented and shadows may be ignored.
Even though they may be short-lived and are simple hearsay,
emergent perceptions within the process may be more accurate in-
dicators of the factors that bear upon the operation and fate of the
process. Despite the threat of reevaluation, the intrinsic appeal of
29 Id.
30 Interviews with Morey L. Sear, former Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, Oct. 15, 2001; The Honorable Peter Beer, Senior Judge, U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Nov. 19, 2001: The Honorable James L. Dennis,
Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, April 6, 2002 by the author.
31 Interviews of Douglas Cheney, California Business Executive, in Bethesda, MD. (Sept. 20,
2005).
32 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAu, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 655 (2d ed. 2007)
(citing the observation of John Borgo, Esq.).
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arbitration to commercial interests and to the judiciary at this stage
remains profoundly compelling.
La Bete Noire
One of the persistent themes of the first panel was the un-
stated and unexplained contempt in which the critics of adhesion-
ary or disparate-party arbitration held the National Arbitration
Forum ("the Forum").33 It was never made evident that the assault
was based upon and reflected a reiteration of the highly questiona-
ble Public Citizen Study. By definition, ideologues need a target, a
bite noire, upon which to foist their invectives. For the critics of
adhesionary or disparate-party arbitration, the Forum is as the
French say, "a bon dos."' 34 This critique of the Forum coincided
with the parade of horribles from the debt collection cases, and the
linkage between the Study, the Forum, and animosity towards arbi-
tration eventually became clearer.35 More neutral observers
claimed that the Forum does not have a due process protocol for
consumer and employment arbitration cases such as other arbitral
service-providers. 36 Even that perception, however, is questiona-
ble. The Forum's website contains an Arbitration Bill of Rights
and Code of Conduct for Arbitrators.37  Another speaker as-
serted-in a display of tautologous reasoning-that the Forum
must favor employers and manufacturers because too many com-
panies bring their dispute resolution business to the organization.
For some, success and the profitability that proceeds from it always
generate suspicions, unless you are a State-owned or nationalized
company, in which case your business practices are always beyond
reproach or, at the very least, presumed to be in the public interest.
The Forum has created a niche in the competitive business of
arbitral service-providing by using legal professionals as its neu-
33 See National Arbitration Forum, http://www.adrforum.com/main (lasted visited Feb. 27,
2009).
34 Generally translated, to state that the Forum "a bon dos" means the Forum bears the
burden of having all the animosity to arbitration directed against it. See Liternaute Encylopedie,
Expressions: Avoir Bon Dos, http://www.linternaute.com/expression/langue-francaise/565/avoir-
bon-dos (last visited Mar. 2, 2009); WordReference Forum, http://www.forum.wordreference.
com/showthread.php?t=117464 (Mar. 2, 2009).
35 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.; infra notes 41-71 and accompanying text.
36 The accuracy of the comment may depend on what is meant by a due process protocol. It
is difficult to believe that the Forum operates without any real standards of integrity.
37 See National Arbitration Forum, http://www.adrforum.com/main (last visited Feb. 27,
2009).
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trals, requiring them to apply the law in their awards, and making
substantive appeals to the courts possible for errors of law.38 The
Forum, in effect, establishes a unique link between the arbitral pro-
cess and legal values. It is, like other similar organizations,39
acutely aware of the need to maintain the integrity and profession-
alism of its adjudicatory tribunals. It could not, and would not,
continue to survive as a player by supplying corrupt services that
favor the stronger of two parties. The law of vacatur is available to
nullify awards that are rendered by biased arbitrators. In fact, the
most likely ground for nullifying an award is "evident partiality" as
reinterpreted by the contemporary decisional law.4° If hundreds of
Forum arbitrators were reaching tainted determinations, a large
number of awards would have been set aside.
ATTACKING THE BEAST
Left-wing groups, Public Citizen and the City of San Francisco
among them,41 have launched a campaign against the Forum be-
cause the organization administers arbitrations between credit card
companies and delinquent cardholders, the celebrated debt collec-
tion cases referred to earlier.42 It is always difficult to distil objec-
tive information from tit-for-tat adversarial exchanges. There are
few visible points of light in the bombardment of allegations and
counter allegations. Be that as it may, the Public Citizen Study of
the Forum Cases depicts Forum arbitrators as adjudicators who
favor the credit card companies in order to feed their addiction to
spectacular incomes. 43 Favoring the deep pocket secures reap-
pointment and more revenue. The companies are the arbitrators'
"most loyal customers. ' 44 The arbitrators, in effect, have a finan-
cial stake in the outcome of the adjudication and are "evidently
38 See id.
39 See AAA HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ch. 4 (Thomas E. Carbonneau &
Jeanette A. Jaeggi eds., 2006).
40 See Crow Constr. Co. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2002); Lucent Techn.
Inc. v. Tatung Co., 379 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2004).
41 The City of San Francisco is known as a liberal bastion. See Sheldon Alberts, America A
Crossroads San Francisco: California City Practices Politics Its Own Way, CANWEST NEWS SER-
VICE, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=9769aae7.ba3-
bb5O-2c7aaa7d6e49.
42 See supra notes 19-22.
43 See The Arbitration Trap, supra note 19.
44 Id.
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partial" to one of the litigating parties.45 Under this reasoning, law
enforcement should favor gangs and oncologists should favor to-
bacco companies. It is inconceivable that this would-be wholesale
corruption of the arbitral process should escape the attention of
the courts, especially in California where the courts disfavor arbi-
tration and are receptive to challenges against it.46 Surely, one of
the dedicated Public Citizen lawyers would by now have instituted
a veritable eternity of vacatur actions. The logic of this accusation
fails to account for the arbitrators' loyalty and allegiance to the
integrity of professional adjudication.
Thereafter, the Study claims that "busy" arbitrators can make
annual incomes of hundreds of thousands of dollars.47 There are
superstars in every profession. Lawyers also can and do make sub-
stantial incomes. Financial success does not imply corruption, but
it does breed envy. The broad brushstroke statement suggests
much more than it actually establishes. There is no doubt that the
business of being an arbitrator can be lucrative. It is, however, a
complex area of professional activity, full-time for some and part-
time for others. While it can yield large fees, there are operating
and transactional costs that greatly reduce net revenues. For many,
it is a consulting activity. Few arbitrators charge $10,000 per day,
$400 or more per hour, or make a million or more dollars a year. If
at all realistic, these figures are much more likely to apply to prom-
inent international arbitrators, not arbitrators who do debt collec-
tion cases involving credit card companies and cardholders.48 In
any event, by and large, arbitrators are committed to and respect
their profession.
The Study claims that California Superior court judges are
paid an annual salary of $170,000. 4 9 Be that as it may, it is indispu-
table that a migration has taken place from the state bench in Cali-
fornia to private arbitration (or contract arbitration, as it is known
in California). 5° As the Chief Justice of California himself noted,
45 Id.
46 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (2000);
Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Ca., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 988 P.2d 67 (1999); Jones v. Ci-
tigroup, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 (App. Ct. 2006).
47 See The Arbitration Trap, supra note 19.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Hon. Ronald M. George, Cal. Chief Justice, State of the Judiciary Address to a Joint
Session of the Legislature, Sacramento, California (Mar. 28, 2000), available at http://www.court
info.ca.gov/reference/soj0300.htm.
We have seen an exodus of experienced judges retiring from the bench at the first
opportunity in order to earn more money as private judges. These departures only
2009] ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION 409
the ranks of California judges have been significantly depleted by
premature retirements. 51 The retired judges typically become full-
time arbitrators and earn significantly more money. They also sur-
render the security of their civil servant status and engage in the
risk of creating a growing economic enterprise. Lawyers who for
years have managed trial proceedings are valuable assets in the ar-
bitration industry. The same stream of professional movement oc-
curs in the Washington, D.C. lobbying industry, with results that
have a far more questionable character. There, influence-peddling
is the purpose of trading on professional expertise and experience.
The availability of increased income does not identify a problem
with the integrity of arbitration. Rather, it suggests that the public
regulation and provision of adjudicatory services may be misguided
or ill-conceived.
A contemporary International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC") study established that attorney's fees constituted nearly
eighty percent of the cost of an ICC arbitration.52 While the study
sustains the ICC's efforts to amend its reputation as an expensive
arbitral service-provider,53 it indicates that the primary expense for
litigation, even in arbitration, rests with attorneys. ICC arbitrators
often complain that the ICC's fee scale, charging a percentage of
the amount in dispute,54 leaves them with a modest hourly rate that
encourage the further development of a two-track system of justice in which the best
and the brightest move to the private track rather than use their experience to serve
the public.
Id. Life's Tough, Your Honors, Opinion, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at B14, available at http://
www.articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/07/opinion/ed-judges7; Eric Berkowitz, The Lucrative Busi-
ness of Arbitration-Judges Reaping the Bounty, Is Justice Served?, HomeOwners for Better
Building Nov. 19, 2006, http://www.hobb.orglindex.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=
1371&Itemid=197&mosmsg=item+successfully+saved; Justice, For a Price, UNIV. SOUTHERN
CAL. ANNENBERG FILES, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.blogs.uscannenberg.orglannenbergfiles/2007/
08/is_.justiceserved by_eric berk.html.
51 See George, supra note 50.
52 See Report from the ICC Commission on Arbitration, Techniques for Controlling Time
and Costs in Arbitration, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/TimeCost-E.pdf (last
visited Jan. 10, 2009). In the Introduction, the Report expressly provides that eighty-two percent
of the average costs of ICC arbitrations that "went to a final award in 2003 and 2004" consisted
of "costs borne by the parties to present their cases." Such costs could include "lawyers' fees
and expenses, expenses related to witness and expert evidence, and other costs ...." Arbitrator
costs constituted sixteen percent of expenditures and institutional charges two percent. See also
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 729
(2006); John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorney's Fees in International Commercial Arbi-
tration, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1999).
53 See International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, www.
iccwbo.org/court/arbitration (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
54 Id.
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hardly compares with the hourly rate for consulting activity by a
senior legal person." The "pot of gold" view of arbitration misrep-
resents the financial realities of the process for arbitrators.
The Study also contends that only a small group of over-em-
ployed arbitrators sit in most of the Forum's credit card debt col-
lection cases and that they rule in favor of the company in more
than eighty-five percent of cases. 5 6 Although expertise and profes-
sional experience are prized in adjudication, the Study once again
suggests that arbitrator reappointment must be a quid pro quo for
unabashed corruption.5 7 The innuendo transforms indebted card-
holders who are unable to pay their bills into the forlorn prisoners
of an abusive process that prejudices their interests. In these cir-
cumstances, the critical consideration should be how arbitrators are
selected.5 8  The Study touts the California arbitrator disclosure
standards,59 but they seemingly have been insufficient to safeguard
indebted cardholders from the tainted Forum arbitral process. The
disclosure standards themselves are not without controversy.6 °
They are seen by many as needlessly invasive and overly demand-
ing.61 Their principal effect is to increase the prospect of vacatur
for properly rendered awards. 62 Other state jurisdictions are not as
distrustful of arbitration. Legal standards for arbitrator disclosures
complicate arbitral procedures and then provide little meaningful
protection for the users of the process. They embody a form of
55 Id.
56 See The Arbitration Trap, supra note 19.
57 Id.
58 The importance of arbitrator selection and quality cannot be overemphasized in any cir-
cumstance of arbitral adjudication. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRcArICE, supra note 32, at
628. Giving the weaker party a larger role in the appointment of arbitrators, weighting the
tribunal in its favor, or establishing procedural presumptions in its favor might rectify, or help to
rectify, the imbalance of the contract relationship. Id.
59 See The Arbitration Trap, supra note 19 ("Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in
Contractual Arbitration"-California Rules of Conduct app. at div. VI [2003]).
60 See SEC, Release No. 34-51213, 70 Fed. Reg. (FR) No. 35 at 8862-63 (Feb. 23, 2005).
61 See Jaimie Kent, Debate in California Over and Implications of New Ethical Standards for
Arbitrator Disclosure: Are The Changes Valid and Appropriate?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903
(2004); Bethany L. Appleby, Are California's Arbitrator Disclosure Requirements Preempted by
the FAA?, 25 A.B.A. FRANCHISE L.J. 187 (2006); Keisha I. Patrick, A New Era of Disclosure:
California Judicial Council Enacts Arbitrator Ethics Standards J. Disp. RESOL. 271 (2003). For
the decisional law debate, see Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097,
amended by 260 F. Supp. 2d 979 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald,
400 F.3d 1119 (2005); Jevine v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685 (2005); Ovitz v. Schulman,
35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117 (Cal. App. 2005).
62 See Richard Chernick, Disclosure Rules May Apply to Party-Appointed Arbitrators, L.A.
DAILY JOURNAL, Feb. 12, 2003; Richard Chernick, Decisions Change Arbitrator Disclosure Dis-
qualifications, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 2004, available at http://www.jamsadr.com.
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regulation that primarily discourages recourse and hinders the pro-
cess.6 3 They do not cure or prevent abuse, thereby failing to de-
liver on their promised regulatory effect. The integrity, neutrality,
and impartiality of arbitrators are vital to the arbitral process.
Courts, in California and elsewhere, should be as vigilant about
maintaining the professionalism of arbitrators as they are respect-
ful of the arbitrator's decisional and managerial independence.
The remainder of the Study contains equally misleading half-
truths presented as fact.' Atypical incidents are portrayed as char-
acteristic and described selectively to achieve maximum dis-
informational effect.65 Advances in the case law on adhesionary or
disparate-party arbitration are completely ignored, despite the fact
that they demonstrate that the partnership between courts and the
arbitral process is healthy and can rectify problems. Finally, the
Study decries the limited appeal in arbitration.66 Restricting ap-
peal contributes to the functionality and economy of arbitration.
Finality is reached in arbitral proceedings through a reasonable and
sensible procedure. As noted earlier,67 the Forum procedure does
an exceptional job incorporating the possibility of appeal for errors
of law. It is curious that the Study does not at least account for this
feature of the Forum arbitration. Be that as it may, not every-
and, quite possibly, very few-"adverse '' 68 awards rendered against
indebted, delinquent cardholders warrant merits review. The pros-
pect of appeal is often part of the lawyer's game, as it can serve to
discount a defendant's liability.69 It is not part of the concern for
fundamental fairness, but rather a means of justifying attorney's
fees. 70 Average people, like credit card holders, actually breach
agreements and engage in culpable conduct. As stated previ-
63 See, e.g., Appleby, supra note 61.
64 See The Arbitration Trap, supra note 19.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
68 See The Arbitration Trap, supra note 19.
69 On the function of appeal, see, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process As A Means of
Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995); Martin Shapiro, Appeal, 14 LAW & Soc.Y REv.
629 (1979); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: De-
fendants' Advantage, 3 AMER. L & ECON. REV. 125 (2001). See generally WAYNE V. MCINTOSH,
THE APPEAL OF CIVIL LAW: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LITIGATION (1990); MARC
GALANTER, A BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO THE LITIGATION MAZE (1992).
70 See generally Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2006); Richard Nobles & David Schiff, The Right to Appeal and Workable Systems of
Justice, 65 MOD. L. REv. 676 (2008); MARC GALANTER, A BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO THE LITIGA-
TION MAZE (1992).
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ously, 1 the problem with this type of litigation does not reside in
arbitration by the Forum or any other arbitral institution, but
rather in either the commercial practices of the credit card compa-
nies or the nature of debt collection cases. Engulfed by the haze of
its own ideology, Public Citizen is shooting at the wrong target.
CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION
Both opponents and proponents of arbitration made state-
ments about the case law that misrepresented the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in a landmark arbitration case. On several occa-
sions, speakers contended that the ruling in Green Tree Financial
Corporation v. Bazzle72 established the availability of class action
litigation in arbitration. The holding actually created a different
rule. The Court held that the arbitrator's decisional authority ex-
tended to the interpretation of the arbitral agreement.73 Once a
court confirmed the existence of a valid contract of arbitration or
that a First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan74 jurisdictional di-
rective applied, the arbitrator, as a matter of law, would establish
what the arbitral clause provided. The expansion of arbitrator au-
thority was meant to reduce litigation about arbitration.75 In other
words, the arbitrator would decide whether the arbitral clause pro-
vided for classwide arbitration proceedings. True class action avail-
ability came when service-providers, in response to assertions of
the loss of remedial rights, began to administer classwide arbitra-
tions, thereby allowing affected parties the would-be benefit of
class procedures and relief in arbitration.76 Courts remain divided
on the issue of the enforceability of class action waivers in adhesio-
71 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
72 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
73 Id.
74 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (holding that the con-
tracting parties could, in their agreement, authorize the arbitrators to rule on challenges to their
own jurisdiction, thereby removing the question from the courts). In effect, the contracting par-
ties could "direct" the arbitrators to resolve challenges to their authority to rule in the agree-
ment to arbitrate. Party choice and provision on this matter preempted the application of the
otherwise controlling statutory text, FAA § 3.
75 Id.
76 AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, http://www.adr.org/Classarbitrationpolicy (last visited
Apr. 23, 2009); AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=21936 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
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nary arbitration agreements between unequal parties. 77 Proffering
all remedial options in arbitration, despite its negative impact upon
the operation of the process, is probably the most sagacious policy
to pursue in adhesionary or disparate-party arbitration.
A TRINITY OF INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS
Three of the most insoluble problems in arbitration have a
very visible presence in adhesionary or disparate-party arbitration.
The problems relate specifically to party inequality. They are in-
ter-related, but are not exclusive to arbitration-they exist among
unequal parties in the process of judicial litigation as well. Argua-
bly, the latter has more procedures by which to protect parties
against the consequences of such problems. Companies have
greater experience with, knowledge of, and resources for litigation;
they are more lucid about adjudication and better understand its
rules and objectives. The repeat player problem 78 exemplifies the
effect of party disparity upon the proceedings and the protection of
interests within the process. Arbitrators see companies and their
representatives more frequently than individual employees or con-
sumers. Not only are the corporations more aware of, and familiar
with, the arbitral process, but the process and its agents are more
familiar with them. This circumstance could breed either an under-
lying contempt or a procedural or psychological advantage. Once
the company agrees to pay the costs of arbitration to avoid attacks
on the validity of the arbitration agreement,79 the possibility of col-
lusion between the arbitrators, the arbitral service-provider, and
77 See Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Nations Personnel of Texas, 343 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003);
Jones v. Citigroup, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361 (App. Ct. 2006); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446
F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006). See also Pamela A. Maclean, Class Action Waivers Hit A Wall, 29 NAT'L
L.J. 5, col.l (2007).
78 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the Haves Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Sys-
tems: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19 (1999); Edward A. Dauer,
Judicial Policing of Consumer Arbitration, 1 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 91 (2000).
79 The current case law encourages, and may require, companies to pay for the totality or a
large portion of the costs of arbitration when they impose arbitration on their employees or
consumers. See Cole v. Burn Int'l Security Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (2000). The court opinions
state that the payment of costs alleviates the unfairness of the unilateral imposition of the con-
tract of arbitration. While it achieves that objective, it may also lead arbitrators, subconsciously
or otherwise, to favor the party paying for their fees and other arbitral costs. Whether this factor
weights the process is speculative and difficult to establish.
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the payor party80 is heightened-at least in theory, or "outward
seeming", as Justice Cardozo would say.81
The same problem can surface in judicial proceedings. It
arises from the stronger party's natural edge and it is difficult, if
not impossible, to eliminate. Demanding that sole arbitrators be
chosen at random by the weaker party or that arbitrators never
reappear in proceedings involving a prior party might alleviate the
inequality. Such procedures, however, tilt and thereby compro-
mise the process and burden arbitrations with delay and enhanced
costs, lessening their functionality. Party inequality remains and
the process is little improved, if not worsened. Truly neutral arbi-
trators make full disclosure, are chosen from an outside adminis-
trator's list or by a court, and seem to be the most effective
solution to the problem.8 2 Establishing actual neutrality and main-
taining its appearance in all circumstances is indispensable to the
continued vitality of adhesionary or disparate-party arbitration.
83
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE LACK OF CONTRACT FAIRNESS
Contractual fairness in arbitrations between unequal parties
remains the principal and principled concern. There are three pos-
sible doctrinal solutions. The first is to espouse the U.S. Supreme
Court's approach. The Court alluded to the issue of adhesion
briefly in only two of its forty-plus rulings on arbitration. 8  In each
instance, the Court acknowledged the problem only to dismiss it
just as quickly. 85 It gave the issue of cost distribution in adhesion-
ary or disparate-party arbitration a greater, albeit equally unsym-
pathetic, presence in its decisional law.8 6 The Court's treatment of
80 The ability of corporations to retain outside legal counsel or to employ in-house legal
counsel demonstrates the advantage of both resource and sophistication. Companies, in fact,
develop policies on litigation as part of their business plan and corporate practices. They have a
fully thought-out and articulated policy when a problem arises, but the employees or consumers
do not.
81 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 342 (1928).
82 See generally ABA-AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Mar. 1,
2004, http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4582, http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial-
disputes.pdf.
83 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
84 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express Co., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
85 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. 477. In each case, the discussion is ten to
twenty lines.
86 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
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challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements is curt and
turns on technical considerations, like burden of proof.87 The cryp-
tic pronouncement on the distribution of costs generated activity
among the lower federal courts to determine a workable analytical
standard for defining the affordability of arbitration. 8 The quest
for a uniform and harmonious standard remains unfulfilled, and
the likelihood of reaching an eventual protocol remote. In effect,
the Court practices an avoidance approach; it deflects and mini-
mizes the difficult analytical issues that relate to the validity of ar-
bitration agreements, thereby preserving the enforceability of the
agreements despite allegations of unfairness and imbalance in their
formation.
A second solution was suggested by the Seventh Circuit when
it articulated a new definition of lawful contract formation. The
definition also revised the concept of fairness in contract relation-
ships. In addressing the validity and effect of an adhesion contract
in a consumer transaction, the court held that unilaterally drafted
and imposed "agreements" are valid contracts as long as they pro-
vide each party with real, substantial, and serious benefits.89 In ef-
fect, negotiated mutuality is replaced by the exchange of
objectively desirable advantages. Standardized contracts that facil-
itate the acquisition of goods and services by consumers at lower
prices is of considerable significance to the purchaser. 90 Applying
this reasoning to arbitral agreements, both parties are given access
to a functional, fair, economical, and effective adjudicatory process
that achieves the timely and binding resolution of disputes. Under
the Seventh Circuit's holding, the exchange obviates adhesion and
renders the agreement enforceable.
Finally, contract fairness concerns could be addressed through
the adoption of the English rule for arbitration in consumer trans-
actions. 91 In 1989, the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland enacted legislation that established
that the submission agreement was the only arbitration agreement
87 Id.
88 See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001); Perez v.
Globe Airport Sec. Serv., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2001); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003); Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003).
89 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808
(1997).
90 Id.
91 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, SUPPLEMENT FOR CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 15 (1998).
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that could be incorporated into a consumer contract. 92 In effect,
once a dispute arose, the consumer could choose to go to court or
submit the dispute to arbitration. Like the eventual European
Union ("EU") rule93 on this topic with which it was merged, the
provision accounted for the parties' inequality. The would-be con-
tract unfairness in adhesionary or disparate-party arbitration in the
United States could be remedied by the adoption of a similar pro-
vision. Giving consumers and employees the right to choose the
form of adjudication might quell the criticism of consumer arbitra-
tion, but it also foils the Court's ambition of expanding arbitra-
tion's range of application in civil dispute resolution.94
In order to preserve the latter objective and entice the weaker
party to choose arbitration, companies could, upon the emergence
of a dispute, offer to pay the entire cost of arbitration as well as a
percentage of the weaker party's attorney's fees if the weaker party
selects arbitration. The company could further agree to discount
any award it receives in its favor by a given percentage in exchange
for the promise to arbitrate. In employment circumstances, at
least, this offer could be tendered at the outset of the relationship,
effectively requesting that the employee enter into an arbitral
clause. These financial incentives could be communicated to the
arbitrators at the outset of the proceedings and incorporated by
them into the final award. The availability of litigation contributes
to social civilization, but it is inextricably bound to the quest for
individual financial gain and advantage. The proffer of arbitration
can serve both of these goals.
The prospective accommodation could establish an acceptable
balance between risk, reward and the traditional dictates of con-
tract fairness on the one hand, and the Court's policy to provide
greater and more effective citizen access to civil adjudication on
the other. It would be unfortunate to prevent already dispossessed
citizens from availing themselves of the benefits of arbitration.
Adhesionary or disparate-party arbitration could become a type of
specialized arbitration, like NASD or maritime arbitration. 95 Spe-
92 Id.
93 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, HEALTH & CONSUMER PROTECTION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL,
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TEN BASIC PRINCIPLES 7, 12 (2005);
PAOLISA NEBBIA & ToNY ASKHAM, EU CONSUMER LAW (2004); STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU
CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY (2005); A CASEBOOK ON EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW (Reiner
Schulze & Hans Schulte-Nolke eds., 2002).
94 See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 32, at xv-xvi.
95 See SEC LAw.CoM, Arbitration Information Center, http://www.seclaw.com/centers/
arbcent.shtmIl (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); THOMAS J. HINES & JOHN K. BRUBAKER, NASD ARBI-
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cific provisions, like the English rule, could be developed to allevi-
ate problems and assuage weaknesses, as well as to assist interested
communities in gaining beneficial access to the process.
96
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
The presentations on international commercial arbitration
("ICA") were generally less controversial and more cogent than
the discussions of domestic arbitration. Although investment arbi-
tration 97 is-by definition and in practice-something of an excep-
tion, arbitration in the transborder context has thus far escaped
being mauled by the claws of politicalization. 98 It is vital to global
TRATION SOLUTION: FIVE BLACK BELT PRINCIPLES TO PROTECT AND GROW YOUR FINANCIAL
SERVICES PRACTICE (2007); see also W. REESE BADER, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PRACTICE
AND FORMS (looseleaf, updated periodically); Society of Maritime Arbitrators, About the SMA,
http://www.smany.org/sma/about.html (Table of Contents) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); Maritime
Arbitration Association of the United States, Mission & Values, http://www.maaus.com/who-we-
are/mission-%26-values (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); see generally GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS, INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL AND MARINE ARBITRATION (2008).
96 The Society of Maritime Arbitrators ("SMA") Rules, for example, have rules on consoli-
dation and the publication of awards that are customized to this form of arbitration and its users.
In Section 1, the Rules provide that, "Unless stipulated in advance to the contrary, the parties,
by consenting to these Rules, agree that the Award issued may be published by the Society of
Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. and/or its correspondents." The provision reflects and reinforces the
long-standing SMA practice of publishing rendered awards in a special collection for purposes of
general reference and use in subsequent arbitrations.
Section 2 of the Rules provides that, "The parties agree to consolidate proceedings relating
to contract disputes with other parties which involve common questions of fact or law and/or
arise in substantial part from the same maritime transactions or series of related transactions,
provided all contracts incorporate SMA Rules." The content of the provision reflects to the
interconnected character of standard maritime transactions. The latter usually involve a ship
owner, the rentor of the vessel, a supplier, a purchaser, and various insurers. Consolidation of
related arbitrations for a single incident fits hand-in-glove the basic transactional circumstances.
In adhesionary or disparate-party arbitration, there could be special rules regarding the ap-
pointment of arbitrators, the composition of the arbitral tribunal, the assessment of damages, the
payment of fees, and the review of awards. Such rules should transcend the rudimentary charac-
ter of the various due process protocols in the field. They should yield a fully adapted regulation
of the unique characteristics of the process. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION, ch. 3 (3d ed. forthcoming). (This book is published by Juris Publish-
ing, Inc. and will appear in the Fall).
97 See T.J. GRIERSON WEILER, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2008); KAJ HOBER, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A
DEFINITION OF EXPROPRIATION (2007); CAMPBELL McLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MAT-
THEW WEINGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES
(2007).
98 There appears to be a general consensus among States that ICA needs to operate on a
self-regulatory basis in order to insure the efficiency and effectiveness of the process. The con-
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commerce and an effective means of resolving breaches in transna-
tional commercial agreements. 99 Regardless of its utility and func-
tionality, ICA is not a panacea or without its imperfections.
Disagreements exist about the role of the arbitrators, legal counsel,
and the courts; the collection of information; the use of experts;
and the presentation and examination of witnesses."° Stipulations
in the contract of arbitration, the choice of an arbitral service-pro-
vider, or the selection of a particular law of arbitration can resolve
many, if not all, of these issues. 10 1
Several recent developments reflect ICA's current standing
among world legal systems. First, the success of arbitration is di-
rectly linked to its resilience and capability for pragmatic adapta-
tion. For instance, the ICC rules require that the parties enter into
an agreement at the outset of the process that contains the terms of
reference. 10 2 The latter are basically equivalent to a submission
agreement. They represent a statement of the matters to be sub-
mitted to the arbitrators for resolution, thereby establishing the ar-
bitrators' jurisdiction. 103 Their articulation requires the parties to
agree about their disagreement. Litigating parties often cannot
agree on these rudimentary issues, causing the arbitration to be
delayed and creating greater expense and depletion of resources.
In order to minimize this problem, ICC arbitrators began to estab-
lish the terms of reference themselves. 10 4 When parties indicated a
typical inability to come to terms about the elements or characteri-
zation of their disagreement, ICC arbitrators would generally in-
form the parties that the terms of reference would be defined
during the proceedings. In other words, the trial process would
yield the necessary understanding of the specific matters in dispute.
sensus is concentrated and especially strong among North American and European States, but
applies elsewhere in the world as well but to varying degrees. See Carbonneau, Ballad, supra
note 24.
99 See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 32, at 429-33.
100 On the competition between the civil law and common law in arbitral procedures and
proceedings, see CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES
AND NEW TRENDS (Stehan Frommel ed., 1999); Christian Borris, Common Law and Civil Law:
Fundamental Differences and Their Impact on Arbitration, 60 ARB. 78 (1994); Lawrence W.
Newman & David Zaslowsky, Cultural Predictability In International Arbitration, in CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 489 (Thomas E. Carbonneau
ed., 2005).
101 See Newman & Zaslowsky, id.
102 See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 32, at 23.
103 Id.
104 Telephone Interview with Eric Schwartz, Esq., Parnter, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer,
Paris, ICC arbitrator, in Paris France (June 17, 2005).
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At the end of the hearings, the arbitrator would submit the terms
of reference to the parties for their evaluation and comments-
much in the same way that jury instructions are established in an
adversarial civil trial. The final decision on the content of the
terms of reference is made by the arbitrator.
10 5
The foregoing practice reflects pragmatic adaptability. It ful-
fills the objective of devising an effective means of avoiding delay
by quelling the front-end disagreements in arbitration. It has a
substantial doctrinal drawback as well. It allows arbitrators to es-
tablish (or, at least, to participate in establishing) the range of their
own jurisdiction, and thereby eliminates, for all intents and pur-
poses, the possibility of vacatur for rulings on matters not submit-
ted (excess of arbitral authority).0 6 While seeking to encourage
the effective operation of the arbitral process, ICC arbitrators in-
creased substantially their own autonomy and jurisdictional power.
They substituted themselves for the parties, or made themselves
into an ersatz party, on a matter of strategic significance in the ar-
bitral process. The practice eliminated the possibility of party
deadlock and delay, but also entrusted the arbitrators with decisive
authority on jurisdiction-even beyond the reach of the
kompetenz-kompetenz10 7 doctrine.
Second, in a corollary example of pragmatic adaptability, ICC
arbitrators have begun to hear expert witnesses jointly.10 8 The ex-
perts appear before the tribunal, making their presentations and
answering the tribunal's questions. Arbitrators report that these
joint appearances reduce confusion and contradictions and enable
the tribunal to understand more clearly the points being made by
the experts.' 0 9 While the use of adversarial experts represents a
concession to common-law procedure,"10 joint appearances allow
the arbitral tribunal to make the best use of the parties' proffer of
105 Id.
106 FAA § 10(a)(4); New York Arbitration Convention, Art. V(1)(c).
107 Kompetenz-kompetenz, also known as competence sur la competence or jurisdiction to rule
on jurisdiction, gives arbitrators jurisdictional powers that are equal to those of courts. Arbitral
tribunals can rule on questions or challenges that pertain to their right to rule (did the parties
enter into an arbitration agreement?, is it a valid and enforceable contract?, and does it cover
the dispute in question?). Under kompetenz-kompetenz, the arbitrators rule first on these mat-
ters. Their determinations are subject to de novo review by the courts at a much later stage of
the process.
108 See ERIK SCHAFER, HERMAN VERBIST & CHRISTOPHE IMHOOS, ICC ARBITRATION IN
PRACTICE (2005); THOMAS H. WEBSTER & MICHAEL W. BUHLER, HANDBOOK OF ICC ARBI-
TRATION: COMMENTARY, PRECEDENTS, MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008).
109 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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expert knowledge. It attests to the hold of practicality and com-
mon sense on the process. The latter exhibits a continuing ability
to adjust creatively to eliminate flaws and perfect its value as an
adjudicatory process.
Finally, two national court developments should be de-
scribed-one which demonstrates the vitality of the relationship
between national judiciaries and ICA, and the other which testifies
to a misguided judicial practice in regard to ICA. As to the vital
relationship, French courts assumed years ago a position of leader-
ship in regard to arbitration and have persisted without fail in their
commitment to the process. 1 ' These courts adapted an obsolete
domestic law to the exigencies of transborder arbitration and laid
the doctrinal foundation for the statutory overhaul of the French
law of arbitration.112 Their achievements in this field have been
remarkable. French court rulings on arbitration are intelligent and
agile; the courts fashioned rules that reconciled the dictates of legal
dogma with the objective of improving society and advancing the
practical interests of French civilization. French judicial rulings on
arbitration, especially those of the Court of Cassation and the
Court of Appeal in Paris,113 have always been shaped and directed
by decisional clarity, making them exemplary expressions of the
rule of law. These decisions intermediated effectively between his-
tory, societal rules and interests, and practical exigencies. Rather
than erecting barriers to sensible and necessary policy, the French
decisional law on arbitration generated rules that expressed, ad-
dressed, and satisfied the needs of society, thereby guiding the
French legal system to a position of preeminence in the field.
The decision in the recent NIOC v. Israel case114 indicates that
the French courts continue to assume a vigorous position in the
development of international legal rules on arbitration. The facts
of the case are well-known and need not be recited exhaustively. 115
Shortly stated, the National Iranian Oil Company ("NIOC") filed
an action before the French courts requesting that they appoint an
arbitrator on behalf of Israel which had defaulted on its obligation.
The dispute related to a long-standing pipeline project. The only
connection between the French legal order and the transaction was
111 See Thomas Carbonneau, The Elaboration of A French Court Doctrine, supra note 2.
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, March 29, 2001, 2002, REV. ARB. 427;
Cass. crim., Feb. 1, 2005, Ire Civ. Ch., Juris-Data No. 2005-026746, JCP No. 11, Mar. 17, 2005.
115 Id.
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a reference in the contract to the possible intervention of the ICC,
headquartered in Paris, in the event of a procedural deadlock be-
tween the parties. Apparently, the Israeli refusal to appoint its ar-
bitrator deprived the NIOC of its ability to adjudicate the dispute
and to obtain a resolution of the matter.116 In an opinion eventu-
ally upheld by the Court of Cassation, the French court asserted
jurisdiction over the appointment petition on the basis of the con-
tractual reference to the ICC. It thereafter ruled that French law
required national courts to rule on a matter involving an arbitra-
tion taking place abroad and not involving any national interest or
party in order to avoid a denial of justice in ICA.
While the political undercurrents of the matter are undoubt-
edly explosive, the legal implications of the ruling are far-reaching.
By so holding, the French courts assumed a form of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in regard to matters of transborder arbitration. As
long as the issue involved either the availability of arbitration or
the basic functionality of the proceedings and there was some con-
nection (no matter how tenuous) to the French legal order, the
French courts could intervene to rectify the problem with the im-
plementation of arbitration. A party's inability to arbitrate
amounted to an unwarranted refusal to give effect to the form of
justice agreed upon in the contract. The substance of the ruling
reflects the internationalist doctrines that apply in jurisdictions that
are hospitable to global commerce and ICA.117 In fact, American
and English courts have the statutorily-conferred authority to as-
sume a similar jurisdictional posture in matters of transborder arbi-
tration, although there are no cases in which that authority has
been invoked. 11 8 The French decision is noteworthy because it ar-
ticulates the principle of extraterritorial judicial responsibility for
ICA with doctrinal force and eloquence, and continues to express
the unfailing allegiance of the French judiciary to contract freedom
in global commerce and dispute resolution.
As to the misguided judicial practice, a number of interna-
tional lawyers have indicated that the Swedish courts abandoned
their traditionally deferential approach to the supervision of inter-
national arbitral awards." 9 These courts are now engaging in a
116 Id.
117 See Carbonneau, Ballad, supra note 24.
118 To the author's knowledge. See CARBONNEAU, LAW AND PRACrICE, supra note 32, at 650.
119 Interview with Jan Paulsson, Esq., Partner, Freshfields Brackhaus Deringer, Co-head of
his law firm's international arbitration and public international law groups, Montr6al, Qu6bec,
Canada (May 28, 2008). See generally LARS HEUMAN, ARBITRATION LAW OF SWEDEN: PRAC-
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more extensive examination of the arbitral proceedings and the ar-
bitral tribunal's determination. While awards are not necessarily
nullified more frequently, the Swedish judicial approach, at the
very least, creates substantial insecurity regarding enforceability,
the key consideration in any transnational adjudicatory context.
1 20
A practice of detailed scrutiny and review of arbitral awards never
indicates a legal system that is hospitable to arbitration. The avoid-
ance of judicial reconsideration is not meant to foster commercial
lawlessness or arbitrator unaccountability, but rather it is a means
of securing the parties' bargain for an arbitral determination of
their disputes. The infringement of local courts upon the sover-
eignty of the arbitral process and the arbitrator compromises the
jurisdiction's ability to act as a venue for transborder arbitral adju-
dication.1 2 1 It is both an unfortunate and a costly policy that serves
only to fracture the world community with conflicting perceptions
of the national interest and trans-border legality.
CONCLUSIONS
The Senate sponsor of the Arbitration Fairness Act submitted
a statement to the journal editors, explaining the motivation under-
lying the proposed legislation on arbitration to the conference par-
ticipants and attendees.122 The statement essentially reiterates the
findings included in the bill. It is filled with the same ideological
mischaracterizations of arbitration and fails even to allude to how
the legislation is endorsed by and advances the interests of the
American Trial Lawyers Associative ("ATLA"). In many respects,
it is a defense of the indefensible. The bias against "big business"
is paraded more overtly in the Senator's statement than in the find-
ings. 12 3 Over the years, the Democratic Party has targeted corpo-
rate entities and used the rhetoric of "robinhoodism" to fan the
flames of class warfare. Senator Russ Feingold never refers to the
failure of courts and judicial litigation to protect the legal rights of
American citizens whose claims are not economically attractive to
TICE AND PROCEDURE (2003); FINN MADSEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN (3d ed.
2007).
120 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1183 (2004).
121 Id.
122 See U.S. Sen. Russ Feingold, Protecting the Right to a Day in Court (conference materials,
Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution Symposium, Whither Arbitration? (Nov. 2009)) (on file
with author).
123 Id.
2009] ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION
lawyers or who lack the standing to be noticed, let alone heard, by
society. The right to a civil jury trial is a hollow (not hallowed)
guarantee for whole segments of American society. By supervising
the attribution of arbitral costs and the availability of remedies, the
case law has eliminated much of the potential for inequity in the
reference to arbitration. 2 4 Opponents of arbitration should know
that deliberately ignoring objective facts does not lessen their rele-
vance or persuasive value.
Arbitration does not contribute to, or act as a vehicle for, in-
justice; rather, it fills wide gaps and makes adjudication accessible
to individuals by promoting economy and effectiveness through the
provision of expertise, basic fairness, and binding determinations.
Statutory rights and the freedom from discrimination are more cer-
tain of application in an adjudicatory process that can actually
function. There is no evidence that the arbitral process is "unac-
countable" or that U.S. citizens must be protected from its "ex-
ploitation." The evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. The
hypocritical political discourse is unfortunate because the decep-
tion it contains can be very destructive. If arbitration, in any of its
applications, withers, it will besmirch the process and negatively
effect American democracy and citizens. The duplicity of the left-
wing critique of arbitration should not be allowed to prevail. The
interests of American citizens should be given expression through
the triumph of arbitration and the workable form of adjudication it
embodies.
124 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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